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FROM CONTRACT TO STATUS VIA
PSYCHIATRY
George J. Alexander*
Thomas S. Szasz, M.D.**
I.. INTRODUCTION
The movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a
movement from Status to Contract.
-Sir Henry Maine
The contractual order of society is an order of right and law.
It is a government under the rule of laws, as differentiated
from the welfare state or paternal state. Right or law is the
complex of rules determining the orbit in which individuals
are free to act. No such orbit is left to wards of a hegemonic
society. In the hegemonic state there is neither right nor
law; there are only directives and regulations which the di-
rector may change daily and apply with what discrimination
he pleases and which the wards must obey. The wards
have one freedom only: to obey without asking questions.
-Ludwig von Mises
The law of contracts articulates and enforces the societal in-
terest in the orderly administration of agreements affecting the
production and distribution of goods and services. Since, by def-
inition, contracts are entered into by consenting individuals, the
concept of contract occupies a pivotal position in the ideology of
individualism. The law's recognition of contracts is also a pro-
found recognition of individual autonomy.
In contracting, then, the individual creates a private rela-
tionship which the state will enforce. Contract is, therefore, a
process by which men shape their own destiny, weaving their self-
interest into the fabric of society. Individual decisionmaking
begins the process, individual decisionmaking brings that author-
ity of the state into the contract, and individual decisionmaking
can end the contract by mutual agreement. Contract and au-
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tonomy are inseparable. When the right to contract is severed
from the individual, so is a large portion of his humanity. Yet in
contract, as in other areas of the law, the right is taken away with
astonishing regularity in the name of mental health.
II. THEORETICAL BASIS OF INCOMPETENCY
TO CONTRACT
The right to contract and the concept of mental competence
have been closely intertwined since the Romans.' Because con-
tract is essentially consensual, the capacity to consent to being
bound by it is necessary to the initial act of contracting. This
capacity, it has been long held, is a "mental" quality, and this
mental quality may be impaired by, among other things, "lun-
acy" or "mental illness." Thus, in an 1872 decision,2 the Su-
preme Court held that "[t]he fundamental idea of a contract is that
it requires the assent of two minds. But a lunatic . . . has
nothing which the law recognizes as a mind, and it would
seem, therefore, upon principle, that he cannot make a contract
which may have any efficacy as such,"
The position that mental competency is a prerequisite to
contracting is usually linked with the policy of protecting the
alleged incompetent from himself.4  However, although all the
states claim a connection between competence and contract,' and
most profess to protect the alleged incompetent,' there is a vast
disparity between ends and means, ostensible aims and actual
practices,
In some states, usually by statute, the contract of an incom-
petent is void, and cannot be enforced by the "incompetent" or
his guardian against the "healthy" party.7 In others, although pro-
tecting the incompetent is the professed aim, such protection is
denied if it injures the other party to the contract. The party al-
leging incompetence-or, more often, the party for whom in-
competence is being alleged-may avoid the contract only if the
benefits received can be returned to the other party, placing him
1. Mental Illness and the Law of Contracts, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1021, 1023
(1959) [hereinafter cited as 57 MICH. 1021].
2. Dexter v. Hall, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 9, 20 (1872).
3. Id.
4. Annot., 46 A.L.R. 416, 434-35 (1927) [hereinafter cited as 46 A.L.R.
416]; 57 MicR. 1021, 1025-26; tetn, Piablic Policies Underlying the Law of
Mental Incompetency, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1189, 1213 (1940).
5. 57 MICH. 1021, 1024.
6. See note 4, supra.
7. 46 A.LR. 416, 417-19 (1927); AnnOt., 95 A.L.R. 1442, 1443 (1935)[hereinafter cited as 95 A.L.R. 1442]; Weihofen, Mental Incompetency to Con-
tract or Convey, 39 S. CAL. L. RaV. 211, 230 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Weihofen]; 57 MICH. 1021, 1059-62.
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in status quo ante.8 The basis for this rule is the equitable doc-
trine of avoiding unjust enrichment, and placing the loss, as be-
tween two innocent parties, on the party who made it possible.'
This leads to the curious result of protecting only prudent in-
competents, while refusing to protect the improvident incompe-
tent who has wasted or dissipated the consideration for the con-
tract. If the policy of the law, however, were truly to protect
the incompetent, then it would be necessary to protect him against
his past improvidence no less than against his expected future
blunders. This, in fact, is the rule in a few jurisdictions. In Gib-
son v. Soper"0 the court articulated this policy as follows:
The law ...intends that he who deals with infants or in-
sane persons shall do it at his peril. . . . If the law required
restitution of the price as a condition precedent to the recov-
ery of the estate, that would be done indirectly which the
law does not permit to be done directly, and the great pur-
pose of the law in avoiding such contracts, the protection of
those who cannot protect themselves, defeated.'1
If the only purpose in voiding the contracts of an incompe-
tent were the avowed purpose of protecting him, then he and he
only-either acting through his guardian or on his own behalf
after restoration of his competency-could initiate court action
for avoiding the contract. But such is not the case. During the
incompetent's lifetime, action for voiding his contracts may be
initiated by his "next friend" and sometimes even his creditors,
and, after his death by his heirs, executors, and administrators. 2
Where a contract is set aside after the death of an incompetent,
its voiding obviously cannot be justified on the ground of protect-
ing the incompetent contractor. In such cases, then, where the
aim of the avoidance can only be the protection of the estate, con-
siderations of equity would require restitution as a condition for
voiding the contract; otherwise, the heirs of an improvident de-
cedent would find shelter behind the alleged (or real) incompe-
tence of the deceased at the expense of an innocent third party.
Nevertheless, in distinguishing between conditional and uncon-
8. Weihofen, supra note 7, at 231; 57 MicH. 1021, 1026; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18(c) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
9. 46 A.L.R. 416, 419; 95 A.L.R. 1442, 1443; Weihofen, supra note 7 at
231; 57 MICH. 1021, 1079-89; C. Monms, TORTS 248 (1953). Morris cogently
argues that the law should not intervene between two innocents, as there exists
no reason for shifting the loss, and the legal process adds yet another expense
to be borne by one not at fault. The healthy party may even be the superior
risk-bearer, and thus in Morris's terms should bear the loss no matter who occa-
sioned it.
10. 6 Gray (Mass.) 279, 66 App. Dec. 414 (1856).
11. Id. at 282; 66 App. Dec. at 417; 46 A.L.R. at 434.
12. Weihofen, supra note 7, at 232-33; 57 MICH. 1021, 1064-66.
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ditional powers to avoid contacts, the courts ignore the identity of
the party initiating the process to avoid the contract. 13
II. DEFINITIONS OF INCOMPETENCY
The methods used for adjudication of incompetency, and the
criteria by which incompetence is judged, vary widely. There is,
again, not much connection between theory and practice. In
theory, incompetency must have existed at the moment of the
formation to make the contract void or voidable. 4 How does a
court determine whether the contractor was incompetent at any
one moment? How is incompetency defined? There is little ac-
cord among the states as to the weight to be given previous or
continuing commitment to a mental hospital, a prior adjudication
of incompetency, or acts which the court may view as abnormal.
An adjudication of incompetence is conclusive when made, but
the effect of the passage of time on the adjudication has differ-
ent weight in different jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions there
is a conclusive presumption that the contract of an adjudicated in-
competent is void; in others, such prior adjudication is merely
evidentiary.' 5 Even in states in which carefully drawn distinc-
tions exist theoretically in defining incompetency, those distinc-
tions may be ignored in practice. For example, in New York
commitment to a mental hospital and mental incompetency are
legally unrelated. Thus, persons civilly committed are legally
competent unless they have also been adjudged incompetent.
Nonetheless, the director of one of the major state hospitals for
such persons volunteered the information to one of us (G.A.)
that he considers all of his inmates incompetent and will not al-
low them to exercise any contractual power. Since they are con-
fined to his institution and have no unsupervised contact with
the world, all are de facto incompetent.
The most glaring inconsistency, however, between theory and
practice is in the tests applied to determine incompetency. The
traditional test is cognitive: Was the person capable of under-
standing the nature and effect of the transaction in dispute?' 6
There has been little judicial articulation of a definition of under-
13. See note 12, supra.
14. 57 MIcH. 1021, 1025.
15. Weihofen, supra note 7, 211-15.
16. The precise wording of the test varies from "did he know what he was
doing and the nature of the act done" to "was he mentally competent to deal
with the subject before him with a full understanding of his rights . . . whether
he actually understood the nature and effect of what he did." Green, Judicial
Tests of Mental Incompetency, 6 Mo. L. REv. 141 (1941); Weihofen, supra
note 7, at 216; 57 MICH. 1021.
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standing. In Fischer v. Gorman,"7 the court offered this "defi-
nition": "We are dealing with 'understanding' and not with
mere 'consciousness.' 'Understanding' . . . suggests the concept
of a mind with the faculty of applying its powers of reason to the
elements it comprehends, to the end that a judgment or conclu-
sion may be formed."' 8
A New York court defined understanding somewhat dif-
ferently as "such mental capacity . . . that he could collect in his
mind without prompting all the elements of the transaction, and
retain them for a sufficient length of time to perceive their ob-
vious relations to each other, and to form a rational judgment in
regard to them."'" The emphasis here is more on proper reasoning
and less on accurate perception.
Some jurisdictions have added an "insane delusion" test:
"whether that insane delusion, if a person has it, is a moving
cause to some act which would not have been done except for
that delusion."'20  This test is motivational rather than cognitive
-the party might have understood the nature of the transaction
and its consequences, but might have been impelled by an ex-
travagant and mistaken belief into contracting. Cases in point
are conveyances that cut off a wife's property rights because of
an ostensibly mistaken belief in her infidelity,2' or that bypass a
wife and children for supposedly conspiring against the con-
tractor.22 But can a court determine what is "rational" or "un-
derstood," particularly when the original contractor is dead or
cannot testify for himself?
There is considerable evidence that the courts, whatever they
may say about understanding or cognition, actually look to the
facts of the transaction and apply a conventional normal-ab-
normal test to the end result. The practical effect of applying
this theoretical standard is to deprive the alleged incompetent
of his right to contract because his transaction is eccentric or does
not meet the normative standards of the courts. This is punish-
ment for deviancy, not protection against helplessness. 23
The cognitive test for competency is essentially the same
as the traditional test for criminal responsibility. Both the
17. 65 S.D. 453, 274 N.W. 866 (1937).
18. Id. at 459, 274 N.W. at 870.
19. Paine v. Aldrich, 133 N.Y. 544, 546, 30 N.E. 725, 726 (1892).
20. Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. 217, 52 N.E. 75 (1898); Green, Judicial
Tests of Mental Incompetency, 6 Mo. L. REv. 141, 152 (1941); 57 MicH. 1021,
1031.
21. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 360 Il. 101, 195 N.E. 521 (1935).
22. Riggs v. American Tract Society, 95 N.Y. 503 (1884).
23. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major
Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944).
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M'Naghten rule24 and the rule of "understanding" for the avoid-
ance of contracts were formulated in England in the 19th century.
M'Naghten holds that a man is not responsible for his criminal
act if, at the time of the offense, "he was labouring under such a
defect of reason . . . as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing," and adds the additional ground that if he did
understand his acts, he is excused if he did not know they were
wrong. This moral importation did not find explicit recognition
in the law of contracts, although as we have seen, the courts im-
plicitly consider the "rightness," or normality, of the contract as an
overriding factor in determining incompetence. 25  M'Naghten
also provided for an "insane delusion" test, holding that the de-
fendant would be accountable to the same extent as he would be
if the facts of his delusion were true. The contract version in-
validates the contract which is a product of an insane delusion if,
under all the circumstances, the contractor would probably not
have made the contract if he had been "sane."2  Here again a
moral standard is applied. What the courts mean is that the
contract ought not to have been made.
In this century there occurred a steady expansion of the
criteria for criminal irresponsibility, and it seems likely that there
will be a similar widening of the criteria for contractual incapac-
ity. In Durham v. United States2 7 the accused was declared
"not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product
of mental disease or mental defect."28 The Model Penal Code has
adopted a slightly different standard: "A person is not respon-
sible if . . . as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."2
A similar change-from a strict and exclusive reliance on cog-
nition to a vague and expansive reliance on motivation, volition,
and mental illness-is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 0 which provides that: "A person incurs only void-
able contractual duties by entering into a transaction if by reason
of mental illness or defect (a) he is unable to understand in a
reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the trans-
24. The rule of M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(1843).
25. Green, supra note 23.
26. See note 1, supra.
27. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
28. Id. at 874-75.
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 401 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). See also Platt,
Choosing a Test for Criminal Insanity, 5 WILLAMETTE L.J. 553 (1969).




action, or (b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in rela-
tion to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of
his condition."'"
This broadened rule and two pertinent recent New York
cases suggest that the criteria for competency to contract will be
weakened and undermined just as those for criminal responsibil-
ity have been.
In Faber v. Sweet Style Manufacturing Corporation,2 the
New York Supreme Court allowed recission of an executory con-
tract for the purchase of land allegedly made during the manic
phase of a manic-depressive psychosis. The contractor was com-
mitted to a mental hospital, evidently by his wife and doctor, and
the wife sought recission of the contract. There was no claim
that the contract was unfair or that the other party knew of Fab-
er's illness. Nevertheless, the court, referring to the proposed
Model Penal Code test of criminal responsibility, held that: "In-
competence to contract also exists when a contract is entered
into under the compulsion of a mental disease or disorder but for
which the contract would not have been made."' 3
This broadened test was then cited as authority for the
court's position in Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Board of City
of New York.34 Mrs. Ortelere, while on a leave of absence from
a teaching position following a "nervous breakdown," changed her
retirement application to elect maximum retirement allowance,
which revoked her earlier election of benefits under which she
named her husband a beneficiary of the unexhausted reserve
upon her death. Selection of the maximum allowance extin-
guished all interests upon her death. Two months later, she
unexpectedly died. Her husband sued, both as executor of her
estate and as beneficiary under the former election, to have the
second application set aside on grounds of incompetency. Mrs.
Ortelere's psychiatrist testified that she was psychotic and in-
capable of making a voluntary, "rational" decision. The court
quoted Durham, the Model Penal Code, and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts and held that, while there was no doubt that
Mrs. Ortelere possessed unimpaired cognitive "judgment" 5 and
understanding, her election would be avoided where, by reason
of mental illness in the nature of a medically recognized and
31. Id.
32. 40 Misc. 2d 212, 242 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1963); noted in 39 N.Y.U.L. REV.
356 (1964).
33. 40 Misc. 2d 212, 216, 242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 768 (1963).
34. 25 N.Y.2d 196, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1969); noted in 45 N.Y.U.L. REV.
585 (1970), 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1188 (1970).
35. 25 N.Y.2d 196 at 199, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362, at 365.
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classified psychosis, she suffered volitional and affective im-
pairments of her personality which rendered her unable to control
her conduct or to make a rational decision, and where there had
been no significant change of position of the other party, which
was on notice of her illness. The two dissenting judges disagreed
with the majority's view that Mrs. Ortelere's selection of benefits
was "unwise and foolhardy," pointing out that both she and her
husband needed the money, that she carefully investigated the
alternatives, and that she had no reason to believe her arterioscle-
rosis would so drastically reduce her life expectancy.
It is common knowledge [they wrote], that the present state
of psychiatric knowledge is inadequate to provide a fixed rule
for each and every type of mental disorder. Thus, the gener-
ally accepted rules which have evolved to determine mental
responsibility are general enough in application to encom-
pass all types of mental disorders, and phrased in a man-
ner which can be understood and practically applied by ju-
ries composed of laymen. . . . This rule [the cognitive test]
represents a balance struck between policies to protect the
security of transactions between individuals and freedom of
contract on one hand, and protection of those mentally handi-
capped on the other hand. . . . In the final analysis, the
lay jury will infer the state of the party's mind from his ob-
served behavior as indicated by the evidence presented at
trial. Each juror instinctively judges what is normal and
what is abnormal conduct from his own experience, and the
generally accepted test harmonizes the competing policy
considerations with human experience to achieve the fairest
result in the greatest number of cases.86
Although the opinion of the dissenting judges in the Orte-
lere case gives less scope to psychiatric discretion than does the
opinion of the majority, it goes much too far, in our opinion, in
allowing a jury to determine what is normal and abnormal and
to deny an "abnormal" individual the freedom to contract. Evi-
dently, the dissenters were more concerned with framing work-
able rules for the court than with protecting persons alleged to
be incompetent from attempts to deprive them of their right to
make binding contracts. Nor, moreover, did the dissenters call
attention to the dangers to this right that are obviously inherent
in more elastic tests of competence to contract.
IV. FREEDOM TO CONTRACT V. PROTECTION
FOR INCOMPETENTS
While we believe it is the individual right to make con-
tracts that stands, at present, in greatest need of protection, most
36. Id. at 208, 209, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
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writers who address themselves to this subject believe that the pro-
tection of individuals from their own "incompetence," should be
our first priority. Thus, commenting on the Ortelere case, a
student argued that the court did not go far enough in "protect-
ing the mentally ill. ' '1 7  In particular, he objected to the ma-
jority's holding that when incompetency was volitional the other
party should have notice of it prior to contracting, but that it need
not have such notice when the incompetency was cognitive:
One can infer that the instant court found one type of in-
competent more deserving of protection than another: The
person who does not understand what he is doing deserves
more sympathy than the person who is unable to control his
conduct; or conversely, the latter type of incompetent presents
a greater danger to the security of contracts because he is
more difficult to discover .... If one adopts the latter
standard ... then one must conclude that the majority
desired to extend protection more imaginary than real. The
type of illness compelling one to act against his own best in-
terest is often not visibile to the casual observer.
38
The note's author contended that the fact that the burden
of proof is in the person alleging incompetence to show it existed
at the time of formation is sufficient to protect the security of con-
tracts. 9 Pleading for greater psychiatric discretion, he wrote:
More logically, an expert would be required to consider
only whether a person was compelled to enter into a con-
tract. Thus, severely "neurotic" persons would not be ar-
bitrarily denied the opportunity to avoid a contract simply
because experts decided that their illnesses belonged in one
category rather than another. . . . If a psychiatrist were
allowed to disregard categories and merely analyze an
incompetent's behavior, his testimony would then be highly
relevant in cases like the principle one.
40
Inasmuch as in Ortelere the court recognized that the test-
ifying psychiatrist deliberately distorted his testimony to fit his
diagnosis within the traditional test of incompetency,4' the sug-
gestion that psychiatrists be given even more latitude strikes us
as promoting psychiatry rather than equity. Furthermore, since
37. Note, Contracts-Competency to Contract of Mentally Ill Person Who
Fully Understands Transaction But Is Unable to Control Conduct, 16 WAYNE
L. REv. 1188 (1970).
38. Id. at 1193-94.
39. This is questionable, to say the least: Should we not wonder how
ready, under such circumstances, a prudent person would be to deal with an-
other party of whom he had the least suspicion of eccentricity, particularly if
the criterion of competency were extended to encompass any "mental disease."
40. Id. at 1195.
41. 25 N.Y.2d 196, 201, 204, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362, 367, 370.
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the process of declaring a contract invalid is often initiated by
parties other than the alleged incompetent, who may be dead or
incarcerated in a psychiatric institution against his will, broadening
the grounds for avoiding contracts would only encourage third
parties to try to promote their interests as against those of rela-
tives making embarrassing or inconvenient contracts. The stu-
dent article thus exemplifies the dangers inherent in the protec-
tionist philosophy: the result of such solicitude can easily be that
the contractor is protected into a strait-jacket, both figuratively
and literally.
It is essential, then, that we re-examine the conflict of inter-
ests that is adjudicated whenever the question before a court is
whether or not to deprive an individual of his right to contract on
account of mental defect or disease. Whose interests are actually
protected? What societal interests are advanced, and what oth-
ers are retarded, when contracts are voided, rather than enforced,
in cases of so-called mental illness?
When the state declares a contract void, as it does in manyjurisdictions after an adjudication of incompetence and the ap-
pointment of a guardian,42 and in some states on the mere finding
of incompetence after litigating the contract, 3 it is really declar-
ing that an interest of the state more important than the policy
favoring enforcement of contracts requires that the agreement in
question be nullified. Aside from incompetence, only the
most compelling societal interests will categorically block the con-
tractual process and void the agreement: among these interests
are illegal subject matter, 44 or the deepest moral sensibilities of
the community, often expressed in a statute, that the bargain is
so unconscionable as to be outlawed.45
Various and often inconsistent justifications are advanced
for according special treatment to the contracts of incompetents.
One of these is that, to be valid, contracts require "mutual as-
sent"; hence, contracts that lack such assent should be void.
Another is that since the aim of voiding the contracts of incompe-
tents is to protect them from exploitation at the hands of the
unscrupulous, contracts should be avoidable only by the weaker
party. The courts have not resolved such inconsistencies.46
Still another reason for voiding the contracts of an adjudi-
cated incompetent is to protect the freedom of the guardian in
42. Weihofen, supra note 7, at 228-29.
43. Id. at 230-31.
44. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 598 (1932).
45. For a recent collection of articles on unconscionability and contract law
see generally 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. (1969-70).
46. See, e.g., 46 A.L.R. 416, 95 A.L.R. 1442.
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the proper management of the assets of his ward.4 7  However,
that requires the improbable assumption that all contracts made
by an incompetent will be disadvantageous to him.4"
It is important to keep in mind, moreover, that, in practice,
the party wishing to avoid a contract is usually not the alleged
incompetent but a relative anxious to prevent what it considers a
waste of assets. In a widely-quoted article on the public poli-
cies underlying the law of mental incompetency,4" Dr. Green
recognizes this state of affairs, and asks, appropriately, "protec-
tion of whom?"5 °  His answers are: (1) Protection for society
from the incompetent-the traditional justification for civil com-
mitment; (2) Protection for the incompetent from society-the
traditional justification for paternalistic legislation of all types;
and (3) Protection for the family or dependents of the incompe-
tent from his acts injurious to their welfare. 1 A fourth cate-
gory is conspicuous by its absence: Protection for the incompe-
tent from members of his family who, for reasons of their own,
desire to curtail his autonomy-or to remove him from society
altogether. We must remember, in this connection, that a person
declared incompetent is often deprived of rights to manage his
property, and may in addition be civilly committed to a men-
tal hospital for an indefinite period.
Dr. Green traces society's interest in a special category for in-
competents to a basic recognition that "[t]wo of the ends of the
law are security and equality."52  The law must thus reconcile
conflicting interests in the promotion of the security of transac-
tions, freedom of contract, and the protection of "unequals."
Significantly, Green never mentions what must surely be another
end of the law in a free society-namely, liberty. It is precisely
liberty-individual self-determination-that has been swallowed
up in the battle between protecting transactions and protecting
incompetents.
Whenever the question of competence to contract is ac-
tually litigated, the interests of several parties besides those of
the alleged incompetent and his family come into play. Among
these are the interests of the court itself and, most significantly,
of the psychiatrists who examine the alleged incompetent, declare
47. Weihofen, supra note 7, at 212.
48. In some cases the guardianship has been abandoned without a formal
restoration, yet those states which void the contract require that formality.
Weihofen, supra note 7, at 213.
49. Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency,
38 MICH. L. REV. 1189 (1940).
50. Id. at 1213.
51. Id.
52. id. at 1206.
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him to be incompetent, and then seek to "hospitalize" and "treat"
him. In the voluminous legal and psychiatric literature on in-
competence, there is no end of discussion of the interests of the
alleged incompetent, his relatives and creditors, and of the state;
of the interests of psychiatrists (and lawyers), there is no dis-
cussion at all.
VI. THE PROBLEM OF PATIENT-PSYCHIATRIST
CONTRACTS-A SPECIAL CASE OF CONTRACTUAL
CAPACITY DILEMMA
Conventionally as well as legally, psychiatry is considered
a medical specialty. The psychiatrist is a physician licensed
by the state to practice medicine, not psychiatry-just as the
cardiologist, dermatologist, urologist, etc. is licensed to prac-
tice medicine, rather than his particular specialty. We note
this to emphasize that, like other physicians, in order to diag-
nose or treat his patient, the psychiatrist must enter into a con-
tract with him (or, if this is legally authorized by the state and
acceptable to the psychiatrist, with someone acting on behalf of
the patient). While in emergencies physicians may treat pa-
tients without contract,53 in other cases contract is required, not
only to establish a basis for compensation, but, more importantly,
to protect personal dignity and liberty. Thus, Anglo-Saxon law
does not recognize-that is to say, it entirely disallows-noncon-
sensual treatment. For example, an operation without the pa-
tient's consent--except, again, for emergencies-is not treat-
ment but battery.54  In other words, unconsented surgery is, in
the eyes of the law, tantamount to attack with a knife. There is
no reason, from a legal point of view, to regard unconsented
psychiatric interventions-whether they consist of lobotomy, elec-
troshock, hospitalization, or psychotherapy-in a different light.55
The "assault" in all such cases consists-and this is the crux
of the matter-in the absence of consent; it does not consist of in-
flicting demonstrable injury on the patient-although patients so
treated often do suffer such injury. Since the basis of consensual
medical treatment is a contract between physician and patient, it
is necessary that the patient be fully and correctly informed about
what the physician intends to do in carrying out the treatment.
53. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 113-117 (1937).
54. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, at 105 (3d ed. 1964). [Hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].
55. Perhaps the psychiatric tort, in the absence of physical contact, might
more precisely be titled intentional infliction of mental distress or invasion of
privacy, the intentional torts most closely analogous to completely nonphysical
therapy. See PROSSER, supra note 54, at 112.
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Consent obtained without such knowledge on the part of the pa-
tient is legally ineffective, because it is not "informed." 6  In sur-
gical interventions, "informed consent" requires that the patient
be apprised of the likely effects of the operation and its risks. 7
What constitutes "informed consent" in cases of psychiatric
treatment has yet to be fully explored in court decisions.1
8
Some of the grosser psychiatric abuses represent problems
closely resembling surgical malpracice and a few of them have
been litigated. In the case of Wilson v. Lehman,"' the issue was
consent to electroshock therapy. However, the court did not
deal with capacity to consent, but only with proof of consent.
Mrs. Wilson could not remember whether or not she had con-
sented, because of shock-induced amnesia. Her husband had
not given written consent for the treatment, but had not removed
her from the hospital. The court evidently believed that he was
estopped from claiming lack of consent, although it did not actu-
ally say so. It relied, instead, on the presumption of consent
from the fact of treatment, and failed to consider whether or not
that presumptive consent could have been informed or capable.
It is important to note that the determining factor in the decision
seems to have been lack of actual injury as a result of the treat-
ment. But this decision is inconsistent and ironic for it holds
that Mrs. Wilson suffered from a mental disease severe enough
to require electroshock treatment for it, but not severe enough
to render her unfit to execute a valid contract.
Another case dealing with consent to treatment is Farber
v. Olkon,60 a decision involving a legally incompetent adult child
(aged 31 years), on whose behalf a parent consented to electro-
shock treatments and a lobotomy. The result was two broken
legs, permanently deformed hips, and brain damage. In
ruling on an action brought for injuries, the court held that where
such a "child" is incompetent and has no legally appointed
guardian, the right to consent to treatment is lodged in the parent
who has legal responsibility for maintaining the child. The child
therefore had no right to complain.
In Lester v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 1 the court held
56. Morse, The Tort Liability of the Psychiatrist, 16 BuFFALO L. REv.
649, 650-652 (1967); 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 691, 692-94 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Morse]; Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599, 614-16 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 99
A.L.R.2d 599].
57. PROSSER, supra note 54, at 107.
58. 99 A.L.R.2d 599, 614-16.
59. 379 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1964).
60. 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953).
61. 240 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1957). For an extended discussion of third-
party consent, see Morse, supra note, 56 passim.
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that a legally competent patient may be deprived of his right to
contract for electroshock treatment, if, in the judgment of the
patient's wife and psychiatrist, it is "unwise" to require the patient
to consider the hazards entailed in the treatment. The court
held that, in such a case, the wife could give sufficient consent.
This case is especially interesting as the patient argued, quite sen-
sibly, that allowing his wife to consent for him deprived him of his
freedom to contract, and hence of liberty, without due process of
law. The court was not impressed.
Once the physician-patient relationship is established, the
physician has broad discretion as to treatment methods. Mal-
practice standards are generally very protective of physicians, in-
cluding psychiatrists. As a rule, a physician is absolved from li-
ability, even for undesirable and harmful treatment, so long as
he can demonstrate that his patient gave informed consent for
the treatment, and that the treatment falls within the broad
range of what constitutes acceptable treatment within his profes-
sion or specialty.62 However, in Hammer v. Rosen,63 in a suit
brought aginst a well-known psychiatrist specializing in the treat-
ment of seriously disabled "schizophrenic" patients, the court
ruled that where the "treatment" involved beating a patient, the
burden of proof must, because such treatment is seemingly im-
proper, be shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant. This
case merits special attention.
The patient, Alice Hammer, was an adult but legally incom-
petent patient, placed under the care of Dr. John Rosen by her par-
ents. Before Dr. Rosen entered the case, Alice Hammer had re-
ceived more than 200 electroshock treatments "without improve-
ment."6  Dr. Rosen treated Miss Hammer between 1948 and
1955 and collected over $55,000 in fees.
It was brought to the attention of the patient's family that
the defendant made claims to dramatic success in the treat-
ment of schizophrenic patients. The defendant was sought
out, requested to, and did agree to treat the patient. Nurse
H. Louise Wong, who attended the patient for 12 days during
September 1948, testified that on two occasions she took thepatient to the defendant for treatment. On the first occa-
sion she requested the defendant to permit her to be pres-
ent. Defendant, stating that he did not allow anyone to be
present during his treatment of the patient, refused, excluded
62. 99 A.L.R.2d 599, 604-05.
63. 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960). Morse, supra
note 56, offers another view of the case at 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 663-65, 18
SYRACUSE L. REV. 704-707. PROSSER, supra note 54, at 166.
64. Hammer v. Rosen, 181 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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Nurse Wong from his office, locked the door and directed her
to return at the end of an hour. Within 15 minutes thereaf-
ter Nurse Wong heard screams which she identified as those of
the patient emanating from the defendant's office. She re-
turned, attempted to gain access to defendant's office but was
again excluded by defendant. After completion of the treat-
ment on the first occasion, Nurse Wong observed that the
patient's body was covered with bruises, and her clothes were
torn and disheveled. There was no one in defendant's of-
fice except the patient and the defendant ... .
Apart from the testimony of Nurse Wong, there was ample
evidence in the record of defendant's assaults on the patient
on various occasions in the course of his treatments. Mrs.
Hammer testified that after treatments she observed her
daughter was 'beaten up' and had 'blue eyes'; that her daugh-
ter returned from treatments 'black and blue. ' Mrs. Hammer
also testified to conversations with the defendant wherein he
stated that the assaults complained of were part of the
treatment. In addition, Emma Reitz, a maid in the employ
of the Hammers, testified to circumstances establishing that
the defendant slapped the patient without justification during
the summer of 1950 at Bolton Landing, N.Y. 66
Dr. Rosen, the record informs us, ". . . argues that the treat-
ment was knowingly and freely consented to by reason of the fact
that the patient's mother testified that if beating was a means of
cure, she was agreeable to the treatment. '67
The appeals court ruled that, "With respect to the evidence,
it is necessary merely to point out that the testimony given by
three of the plaintiff's witnesses, indicating that the defendant
[Dr. Rosen] had beaten Alice [Hammer] on a number of occa-
sions, made out a prima facie case of malpractice which, if un-
contradicted and unexplained and credited by the jury, would re-
quire a verdict for the plaintiff. '68
"As to the second of the defendant's arguments-that there
was no expert testimony to support the plaintiff's charge of mal-
practice-the simple answer is that the very nature of the acts
complained of bespeaks improper treatment and malpractice
and, if the defendant chooses to justify those acts as proper
treatment, he is under necessity of offering evidence to that ef-
fect."6 9
We might note here that Dr. Rosen articulated his view of
65. Id. at 806.
66. Id. at 806-07 (dissenting opinion).
67. Id. at 807.
68. Id.
69. Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376 at 379-80, 165 N.E.2d 756 at 757,
198 N.Y.S.2d 65 at 66-67 (1960).
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the psychiatric patient's capacity to contract, in one of his pub-
lications, in these rather revealing words: "The individual who
comes in, seeking a treatment, does not know what he is doing.
He may have to be brought in, forcibly, for that matter. But
even if he is capable of recognizing and expressing his desire to
be treated, he does not really know what he is letting himself in
for.
70
In the case of Hammer v. Rosen, then, there was no doubt
that Dr. Rosen had appropriate consent from the patient's parents
for treating her; there was doubt only about whether beating
her was appropriate treatment. Even on this issue the court
did not rule that beating was, regardless of circumstances and con-
sent, malpractice, leaving the door open for support, from Dr.
Rosen, that it was "proper treatment." Indeed, Dr. Rosen could
have protected himself from this suit by a contract specifically
authorizing him to physically discipline patients-an interven-
tion neither invented by Dr. Rosen nor practiced by him alone.
(There is massive evidence that, for more than 300 years, men-
tal patients have regularly been beaten in mental hospitals; oc-
casionally, they have been beaten to death).
VII. THE CONSENT PROBLEM
As we have seen, the physician's contractual obligations to
his patient are minimal, being limited essentially to conforming
his interventions to a broad range of prevailing practices, and to
imposing these on the patient only with the patient's informed
consent to them. A physician may, however, exceed this minimal
obligation by promising a specific result. Should he do this, he
will be held to the expectations his promises have evoked. Thus,
physicians have contracted themselves into obligations to cure,
although failure to cure would not otherwise have constituted
malpractice.71
Moreover, while contractual incapacity might well serve as a
valid defense to other contract provisions, it is unlikely that a
court would be persuaded that the patient's incompetence ef-
70. Id. at 380, 165 N.E.2d 756 at 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 at 67. We will not
belabor our complete rejection of this paternalistic psychiatric posture. It
should suffice to note that the "mental patient" often does not, in fact, know
"what he is letting himself in for." But, in our view, this is not because he is
incompetent or stupid, as Rosen implies, but because the psychiatrist does not
tell him what he proposed to do for and to him. The remedy for this is not
coerced psychiatric treatment, but, on the contrary, the abolition of all such
treatment and the requirement of strict "informed consent" for all psychiatric
interventions.
71. PROSSER, supra note 54, at 165; 99 A.L.R.2d 599, 601 n.3.
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fectively destroyed his reliance on a physician's promise. Gen-
erally, where a substantial disparity of sophistication exists be-
tween the parties, contracts are strictly interpreted against the
stronger party.72  While the patient's incompetence might help
the physician to discredit testimony about disputed facts, it is
not likely to help him defeat the effect of a promise to cure.
Courts have clearly not applied the normal contractual re-
quirement of informed consent to psychiatric contracts, as illus-
trated by the Wilson case, cited previously.
Mrs. Wilson, it will be recalled, was given electric shock
treatment. After the treatment, she could not, because of shock-
induced amnesia, remember whether or not she had given ver-
bal consent to it. There was no record of her written consent,
nor that of her husband. Nevertheless, the court presumed that
consent had been given.
There is good reason, indeed, why, in Mrs. Wilson's case,
the court presumed consent-indeed, "informed consent"; had it
not, it would have cast doubt on the consent given by all psychi-
atric patients for their "voluntary" treatment, especially where,
from the radical nature of the treatment employed, the logical
inference would be that the patient suffered from "severe" men-
tal illness and hence had limited or no capacity to contract.
What, in concrete terms, would this mean? In every case
where a person now voluntarily consents to outpatient electro-
shock therapy or to mental hospitalization-(and to whatever ad-
ditional treatment while confined)-two types of psychiatric
treatments most authorities consider appropriate only for patients
suffering from "major" mental diseases-there would be a pre-
sumption of incompetence to execute valid contracts. The attend-
ing psychiatrists would not be entitled to compensation for
such "non-consensual" treatment, and would, indeed, be liable to
the patient in battery and perhaps criminally for assault. The
upshot would be a radical diminution of psychiatric treatment con-
sequent to contract between patient and physician. A brief psy-
chiatric digression into the history of psychiatry here will show
how very real this possibility is and how relevant it is to the issues
at hand.
Until approximately 1900, there was, for all practical pur-
poses, no such thing as voluntary psychiatric treatment. The
relationship between patient and psychiatrist was not based on
a contract between them, as it was in medicine and surgery-but
was based on a contract between a third party (usually the




patient's family or the state) and the psychiatrist, as it was in pe-
diatrics or penology. In other words, the psychiatrist entered
into a contract with the so-called patient's family or the state to do
something to or with him, and this was (euphemistically) called
"psychiatric treatment." As a rule, treatment was nothing but
imprisonment in an institution called a "mental hospital."
To this arrangement, which of course is still with us, there
was added, during the end of the nineteenth century and the be-
gining of the twentieth, another, based on contract between psy-
chiatric patient and psychiatric physician. This age was inaugu-
rated by the early medical psychotherapists, such as Janet and
Freud, who pioneered not only in practicing a novel type of psy-
chiatric treatment, but more significantly in basing their contact
with their clients on a contract with them rather than with their
surrogates (familial or judicial). In short, they treated their
mental patients as il they were "sane" enough to be accorded the
dignity of entering into a binding contract with them. It is for this
reason that we view the early psychoanalysts as humanists and
liberators; while their contemporary "liberal" followers who do
not hesitate to coerce where they cannot contract must be
viewed in the opposite light.
IX. THE DISCRETION PROBLEM
One of us (T.S.S.) has previously suggested that we distin-
guish between two radically different types of "psychiatry," or
psychiatric practices: Institutional Psychiatry, in which contract
for services is between the psychiatrist and some party other than
the "patient"; and Contractual Psychiatry, in which it is between
the psychiatrist and the patient. The arrangement in Institu-
tional Psychiatry resembles the arrangements parents make for
services for their children-for example, in authorizing experts to
remove a child's tonsils or teach him French; it may thus be said
to rest on, or make use of, a pediatric or paternalistic model of
human relationships. On the other hand, the arrangement in
Contractual Psychiatry resembles, indeed is essentially identical
with, those that clients generally make with experts in free,
capitalist societies-for example, in retaining an architect to
build a house or a lawyer to secure a divorce; it may thus be said
to rest on, or make use of, the traditional legal model of contracts.
Because of the diversities of psychiatric practices, and be-
cause these diversities are now becoming more clearly defined
and understood, it seems necessary now to establish contractually
the limits of the psychiatrist's undertaking. Let us indicate
briefly what this entails.
[Vol. 13
CONTRACTS AND INSANITY
Many of the difficulties surrounding the contemporary prac-
tice of psychiatry-for both patients and psychiatrists-derive
from ambiguities and uncertainties about the nature of the psy-
chiatrist-patient relationship. In particular, we believe that peo-
ple continue to fear and distrust psychiatrists and psychiatric insti-
tutions for a good reason: that is, not because psychiatrists are
any worse (or better) intentioned than other professionals, but
because they enjoy too much discretion over their client once the
client places himself in their care. It seems likely-observation
surely supports this impression-that individuals are often un-
willing to seek psychiatric care because they do not know whether
or not their psychiatrist eschews forms of treatment they do not
want (for example, commitment or electroshock). In other
words, they fear that, even though they had sought out outpati-
ent psychiatric treatment or mental hospitalization voluntarily,
they might, at any moment, and at the discretion of their own psy-
chiatrist, lose their power to contract for further care, including
the rejection of all such "care." This fear and mistrust is, unfor-
tunately, perfectly well grounded in the reality of present-day
mental hygiene laws. Hence, it seems likely that while more
precise definitions of the psychiatrist's contractual powers and
limitations would curtail some of the current psychiatric prac-
tices, it would expand others, by removing the presently justified
fears of many persons to sacrifice their autonomy and yield to
the total discretion of a psychiatrist.
X. CONTRACTUAL PROTECTION
Many recent psychiatric malpractice cases are based on the
failure of the psychiatrist to restrain the patient adequately,7"
with the result that the patient killed himself (or more rarely, in-
jured or killed another person). These cases are now decided with-
out coming to grips with the question of what the psychiatrist
promised to whom. If the psychiatrist contracts with the pa-
tient's family to restrain the patient (and if the contract is otherwise
valid), then the psychiatrist should, on the one hand, be al-
lowed to use the requisite force necessary to carry out his "treat-
ments," and, on the other, be held strictly liable for his con-
tract. However, if the psychiatrist contracts with the patient to
engage in types of psychiatric "treatment" that expressly eschew
coercion and restraint-in short, if the psychiatrist makes no
promise to protect the patient from his own suicidal acts (or oth-
ers from his aggressive propensities)-then it is just as absurd
73. Morse, supra note 56, at 665-73, 18 SYRACUSE L. REv. at 707-15
(1967); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599, at 620-21, 624-25 (1965).
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to hold the psychiatrist liable for failure to restrain the patient
as it would be for his failure to remove the patient's appendix or
refract his eyes.
Psychiatrists thus need clearly-articulated and enforceable
contracts: to protect themselves when they are engaged in re-
straining patients and also when they are engaged in explicitly
eschewing restraints. Psychiatric patients need such contracts
even more: to protect themselves from their own "mental di-
seases" (in so far as this conceptualization is considered
meaningful and deserving of legal ratification), and also from
the "therapeutic assaults"-however justified or rationalized-
of their relatives, employers, and psychiatrists.
For all of these reasons it is of paramount importance both
to the patient and to the physician that the patient be in a posi-
tion to contract legally. The potential legal incompetence of
a patient creates innumerable stumbling blocks even for psychia-
trists who would willingly treat by direction of third parties. For
psychiatrists whose professional ethics prohibit involvements with
third parties, the absence of binding consent would be fatal.
It is possible, of course, that the law will recognize contrac-
tual capacity to consent to treatment in patients whose capacity
would be otherwise denied. It cannot be counted on to do so,
however, and that is a sufficient cause for serious concern. Fur-
thermore, much of contractual incapacity is not derived from
common law, but is legislative.74 The courts would be compelled
to abide by the mandate of the statute.
The failure of the courts to examine the issue of consent in
psychiatry until now may reflect a judicial policy of protecting the
psychiatrist's therapeutic discretionary powers far beyond the
protection afforded other physicians. It may also, as one com-
mentator has conjectured, reflect the greater shrewdness of psy-
chotherapists.75
74. 46 A.L.R. 416; 95 A.L.R. 1442; Weihofen, supra note 7, at 228, 230;
57 MICH. 1020, 1117-18.
75. Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of Psychiatry, 30
TEMP. L.Q. 401 (1957); 99 A.L.R.2d 599, 620 n.20. A revealing sidelight on
the judicial attitude toward the psychiatrist-patient relationship, as against
other doctor-patient relationships, may be found in the proposed Rules of Evi-
dence for federal trial courts. Under proposed rule 504, a patient has a privi-
lege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing, any
confidential communications made during the course of psychiatric/psychologi-
cal diagnosis or treatment. PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES (Revised Draft, March 1971). The rules contain no
such provision for a general physician-patient privilege. Id. Rule 504, Advis-
ory Committee's Note, at 53. Psychotherapists are accorded special treatment
because, in the words of the Advisory Committee, "confidentiality is a sine qua
non for successful psychiatric treatment. . . . A threat to secrecy blocks suc-
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XI. CONCLUSION
In this discussion we have been concerned with the relations
between contract law and psychiatry, and especially the professed
policy of protecting mentally incompetent persons from the con-
sequences of their contracts. This protection is usually seen as
protection against overreaching by those dealing with incompe-
tents."0 Correspondingly, the policy of the state is seen as protect-
ing the weak against fundamentally unfair agreements. It has
been widely recognized that courts do, in fact, look to the fairness
of the bargain in determining whether to uphold the contract.77
One writer has called this evaluation "perilously close to judging
the adequacy of consideration. '78  There is no doubt that the
"adequacy" of consideration, no less than the utility of the sub-
ject matter, is being judged; that this is "perilous," however, is
by no means clear.
cessful treatment." Id. quoting report No. 45, Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry 92 (1960). At the same time, the rule grants three significant ex-
ceptions to this privilege: examination by order of the judge, in which case
disclosure is limited to the particular purpose for which the examination is or-
dered, Id. Rule 504(d)(2); disclosure when the mental or emotional condition is
an element of the patient's claim or defense, or, after his death, when any
party relies on the patient's condition as an element of his claim or defense, on
the theory that, by injecting his condition into the litigation, the patient waives
the privilege, Id. Rule 504(d)(3), Advisory Committee's Note at 55; and, the
piece de resistance, that "There is no privilege under this rule for communica-
tions relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental
illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has deter-
mined that the patient is in need of hospitalization." Id. Rule 504(d)(1).
This remarkable provision allows the doctor to waive the patient's privilege
because, according to the Advisory Committee:
The interests of both patient and public call for a departure from con-
fidentiality in commitment proceedings. Since disclosure is author-
ized only when the psychotherapist determines that hospitalization is
needed, control over disclosure is placed largely in the hands of a per-
son in whom the patient has already manifested confidence. Hence
damage to the relationship is unlikely. Id. Advisory Committee's Note
at 54.
The Committee ignores the early damage to the patient-psychiatrist rela-
tionship inflicted on it by the patient's knowledge that anything he might say
could be used to place him in involuntary incarceration, and the later damage
caused by such shocking abuse of trust. Were this judicial solicitude for the
rights of psychiatrists at the expense of their patients carried over into the field
of contract, the psychiatric profession would indeed have been correct in ignor-
ing the effect on the doctor-patient contract on the adjudication of contractual
incapacity.
76. Green, Fraud, Undue Influence, and Mental Incompetency: A Study
in Related Concepts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 176, 183 (1943); Green, Public Poli-
cies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38 MIcH. L. REV. 1189, 1210,
1216, 1219 (1940).
77. Green, supra note 23.
78. Note, Contracts-Competency to Contract of Mentally Ill Person Who
Fully Understands Transaction But Is Unable to Control Conduct, 16 WAYNE
L. REV. 1188, at 1195 (1970).
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Courts have, by tradition, accorded great weight to the
right to contract freely. But this right has never been abso-
lute; nor is it clear that it would be desirable if it were. The doc-
trine of consideration-meaning that contracts will not be en-
forced by courts unless the contracting parties actually exchange
something of value-remains accepted legal practice, though it
is much disliked by legal scholars. 9
In short, there is little reason to refuse to allow a court
power to look at a bargain as a whole. Furthermore, judicial
power to review contracts in the light of considerations of fairness
and the public interest has been recognized by the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, which contains three sections designed to
protect weaker parties from overreaching by stronger. 80 Tradi-
tional contract doctrine has also allowed recission for fraud,8'
duress," or undue influence" in the formation of a contract.
Modern contract doctrine refuses enforcement to an adhesionary
contract, a standard form contract between two parties of grossly
unequal bargaining power, unless the party seeking to enforce it
can demonstrate notice of the contested provisions and procure-
ment of the "understanding consent" of the weaker party.84
Even innocent misrepresentation will suffice for recission of a
contract, placing both parties in status quo ante.8 5 Courts now
covertly apply equitable doctrines to attempted avoidance of an
incompetent's contract, and it would seem more sensible, and less
dangerous to the rights of the alleged incompetent and the
"healthy" party, to look at the bargain, rather than at the parties.
Such a course is certainly less perilous to the interests of the avoid-
ing party than an adjudication of incompetency, and protects the
good faith contractor who had no reason to know the other party
was incompetent, and whose bargain is fair. The appointment
of a legal assistant to those in need of help might also avoid
some of the difficulties raised in a competency proceeding.
It must be admitted, of course, that if the defense of incom-
petency is disallowed, and the courts are restricted to settled con-
tract doctrine, legal or equitable, some unfortunate contracts will
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 19(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1964).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970),
H§ 231,233, 2341.
81. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 471, 475 (1932).
82. Id. § 492, 494, 495.
83. Id. § 497-99.
84. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Steven v. Fidelity & Gas Co. of New York, 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27
Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
85. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476 (1932).
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survive. A basic policy decision must here be confronted. Will
the interests of the incompetent and of society be better served by
allowing some "undesirable" contracts to survive and be enforced,
or is the sounder policy to continue to make void or voidable the
contracts of the allegedly insane? Clearly, some interests of
the incompetent are served if he is allowed to avoid a contract,
not unfair when made, but inconvenient when sought to be per-
formed. However, in this area, no less than in torts, the other con-
sequences of assuming the role of incompetent mental patient
clearly tip the scales against this strategy for the "patient." Non-
contracting parties, whether they be physicians or creditors should,
of course, be denied the gambit of improving their lot by cast-
ing one of the contractors as insane.
In short, we favor doing away with the legal recognition of
mental incompetency as a ground of avoiding contracts (or mak-
ing the criteria for such avoidance operational not psychiatric,
and precise in the extreme), because we believe that this policy is
most consistent with the traditional moral aims of Anglo-Saxon
law, and especially contract law-namely, the expansion of the
scope of individual self-determination and the protection of per-
sonal dignity; and because we cherish and support these values
and rank them, on our own scale, higher than security or "men-
tal health."
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